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In this paper we review the actual operational data of an anonymous Central 
European Bank, using  two approaches described in the literature: the loss 
distribution approach and the  extreme value theory  (“EVT”). Within the EVT 
analysis, two estimation methods were applied; the standard maximum likelihood 
estimation method and the probability weighted method ( “ PWM”). Our  results 
proved a heavy-tailed pattern of operational risk data consistent with the results 
documented by  other  researchers in this field. Additionally, our r esearch 
demonstrates that the PWM is quite consistent even when the data is limited since 
our results provide reasonable and consistent capital estimates. From a policy 
perspective, it should be noted that banks from emerging markets such as Central 
Europe are exposed to these operational risk events and that successful estimates of 
the likely  distribution of these risk events can be derived from more mature 
markets.  
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Abstract 
In this paper we review the actual operational data of an anonymous Central European Bank, using 
two approaches described in the literature: the loss distribution approach and the extreme value theory 
(“EVT”).  Within the EVT analysis, two estimation methods were applied; the standard maximum 
likelihood estimation method and the probability weighted method (“PWM”). Our results proved a 
heavy-tailed  pattern  of  operational  risk  data  consistent  with  the  results  documented  by  other 
researchers in this field.  Additionally, our research demonstrates that the PWM is quite consistent 
even when the data is limited since our results provide reasonable and consistent capital estimates. 
From a policy perspective, it should be noted that banks from emerging markets such as Central 
Europe  are  exposed  to  these  operational  risk  events  and  that  successful  estimates  of  the  likely 
distribution of these risk events can be derived from more mature markets.   
Key words: operational risk, economic capital, Basel II, extreme value theory, probability weighted 
method 
JEL: G18, G21, G32 
1.  Introduction  
Operational risk has become one of the most discussed topics by both academics and practitioners in 
the financial industry in the recent years. The reasons for this attention can be attributed to higher 
investments in information systems and technology, the increasing wave of mergers and acquisitions, 
emergence  of  new  financial  instruments,  and  the  growth  of  electronic  dealing  (Sironi  and  Resti, 
2007).  In  addition,  the  New  Basel  Capital  Accord  (effective  since  2007)  demands  a  capital 
requirement for operational risk and further motivates financial institutions to more precisely measure 
and manage this type of risk.  
According to de Fontouvelle et al. (2003), financial institutions have faced more that 100 operational 
loss  events  exceeding  $100  million  since  the  end  of  1980s.  The  highest  losses  stemming  from 
operational risk have been recorded in Societe Generalé in 2008 ($7.3 billion), Sumitomo Corporation 
in 1996 ($2.9 billion), Orange County in 1994 ($1.7 billion), Daiwa Bank in 1995 ($1.1 billion), 
Barings Bank in 1995 ($1 billion) and Allied Irish Bank in 2002 ($700 million)
1. Operational risk also 
materialised during the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, when mortgage frauds became a serious 
issue
2. As noted by Dilley (2008), “mortgage applicants with weak financial standing or poor credit 
history have an obvious temptation to exaggerate their income or assets in order to secure a loan”. 
However, the fraud entailed in issuing these mortgages is that although it could be alleged the lenders 
knew  better,  they  deliberately  denied  the  risks
3  and  benefited  themselves  by  collecting  fees  and 
                                                 
1 See Chernobai et al. (2007) or Peters and Terauds (2006) for an overview of examples of operational risk events. 
2 Naturally,  mortgage frauds occurred also before the crisis. However, the number of cheating  applicants was not as high as the 
mortgages were not provided to so many applicants. 
3 We should note that some loans were provided intentionally to applicants with a low creditworthiness – such as NINJA loans (No 
Income, No Job, No Assets).   3
commissions  from  borrowers  who  could  only  rely  on  rising  real-estate  prices  to  support  their 
mortgage payments
4.  
Moreover, there have been several instances of operational risk in Central Europe too.  In 2000 for 
example, a trader and his supervisor at one of the biggest Czech banks exceeded their trading limits 
when selling US Treasury bonds causing a US$53 million loss to the bank. And, in the late 1990s, 
another Central European bank suffered a US$180 million loss as a result of providing financing 
based on forged documents.  More typical examples of operational risk experienced by both Central 
European and other global banks include cash theft, fee rounding errors in IT systems or internet 
crashes. 
Although large operational losses are extreme events occurring very rarely, a bank — or a financial 
institution in general — has to consider the probability of their occurrence when identifying and 
managing future risks. In order to have reasonable estimates of possible future risks a bank needs an 
in-depth  understanding  of  its  past  operational  loss  experience.  As  a  result,  a  bank  may  create 
provisions for expected losses and set aside capital for unexpected ones. In this paper we focus on 
modelling of the economic capital that should be set aside to cover unexpected losses resulting from 
operational risk failures.  
The contribution of this study is threefold. The first contribution is the presentation of a complete 
methodology for operational risk management. Banks in Central Europe generally do not possess 
a methodology to model operational risk since they rely on the competence of their parent companies 
to calculate operational risk requirement on the consolidated basis of the whole group. Therefore, our 
study that proposes the complete methodology might be beneficial for banks willing to model their 
operational risk but not selected a sophisticated methodology yet. 
Secondly, our study is an empirical study which uses real operational risk data from an anonymous 
Central European bank (the “Bank”). We are going to test various approaches and methods that are 
being used to model operational risk and calculate capital requirements based on the results. The final 
outcome of our study is to propose the model of operational risk that could be implemented by the 
Bank. Our estimates ought to be consistent with the real capital requirement of this bank. 
Lastly,  our  analysis  provides  important  results  and  conclusions.  We  have  found  out  that  even  a 
general class distribution is not able to fit the whole distribution of operational losses. On the other 
hand, extreme value theory (EVT) appears more suitable to model extreme events. Additionally, we 
have discovered that traditional estimation using maximum likelihood does not provide consistent 
results while estimation based on probability weighted moments proved to be more coherent. We 
attribute it to limited dataset and conclude that probability weighted moments estimation that assign 
more weight to observations further in the tail of a distribution might be more appropriate to model 
operational loss events. 
This  paper  is  organised  as  follows;  the  second  part  provides  a  literature  review;  the  third  part 
discusses the modelling issues of operational risk and implications for economic capital, while the 
fourth part describes the data used and exploratory data analysis. The methodology is described in the 
fifth and sixth chapter and in the seventh part we discuss the results of our research and compare them 
with the findings of other studies. Finally, the eighth part concludes the paper and state final remarks.   
                                                 
4 As real-estate prices fell, may home owners were forced into foreclosure or into maintaining “upside-down” loans where they owed 
more to the bank in floating-rate mortgages than the house was worth; simultaneously, the lenders were required to take multi-billion 
dollar write-downs.   4
2.  Literature Overview 
“Operational  risk  is  not  a  new  risk…  However,  the  idea  that  operational  risk  management  is 
a discipline with its own management structure, tools and processes... is new.” This quotation from 
British  Bankers  Association  in  Power  (2005)  well  describes  the  development  of  operational  risk 
management in the last years. Until Basel II requirements in the mid 1990s
5, operational risk was 
largely  a  residual  category  for  risks  and  uncertainties  that  were  difficult  to  quantify,  insure  and 
manage  in  traditional  ways.  For  this  reasons  one  cannot  find  many  studies  focused  primarily  on 
operational risk until the late 1990s, although the term ‘operations risk’ already existed in 1991 as a 
generic concept of Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.  
Operational risk management methods differ from those of credit and market risk management. The 
reason is that operational risk management focuses mainly on low severity/high impact events (tail 
events) rather than central projections or tendencies. As a result, the operational risk modelling should 
also reflect these tail events which are harder to model (Jobst, 2007b). Operational risk can build ideas 
from insurance mathematics in the methodological development (Cruz (2002), Panjer (2006) or Peters 
and Terauds (2006)). Hence one of the first studies on operational risk management was done by 
Embrechts et al. (1997) who did the modelling of extreme events for insurance and finance. Later, 
Embrechts conducted further research in the field of operational risk (e.g. Embrechts  et al. (2003), 
Embrechts    et  al.  (2005)  and  Embrechts    et  al.  (2006))  and  his  work  has  become  classic  in  the 
operational risk literature. 
Cruz  et  al.  (1998),  Coleman  and  Cruz  (1999)  and  King  (2001)  provided  other  early  studies  on 
operational  risk  management.  Subsequently,  other  researchers  such  as  van  den  Brink  J.  (2002), 
Hiwatshi and Ashida (2002), de Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), Moscadelli (2004), de Fontnouvelle et al. 
(2005), Nešlehová (2006) or Dutta and Perry (2007) experimented with operational loss data over the 
past few years. 
To this date Moscadelli (2004) is probably the most important operational risk study. He performed a 
detailed  Extreme  Value  Theory  (EVT)  analysis  of  the  full  QIS  data  set
6  of  more  than  47,000 
operational losses and concluded that the loss distribution functions are well fitted by generalised 
Pareto distributions in the upper-tail area. The estimated tail parameters (ξ) for different business lines 
ranged from 0.85 for asset management to 1.39 for commercial banking. Six of the business lines 
have an estimate of ξ greater than one, corresponding to an infinite mean model. Based on these QIS 
data, the estimated capital requirements (β, as defined in the Section 3.3) ranged from 8.3% for retail 
banking to 33.3% for payment & settlement, with an overall α of 13.3%, slightly below the Basel II 
value of 15% used in the Basic Indicator Approach
7. 
Operational risk modelling helps the risk managers to better anticipate operational risk and hence it 
supports  more  efficient  risk  management.  There  are  several  techniques  and  methodological  tools 
developed to fit frequency and severity models including the already-mentioned EVT  (Cruz (2002), 
Embrechts et al. (2005) or Chernobai et al. (2007)), Bayesian inference (Schevchenko and Wuthrich 
                                                 
5 For more details see the Annex 1 – The Evolution of the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk. 
6 QIS – Quantitative Impact Study by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's, another important collection of data is the 
exercise of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (see e.g. de Fontnouvelle et al. (2004)) 
7 For more details see the Section 3.3.   5
(2006)  or  Cruz  (2002)),  dynamic  Bayesian  networks  (Ramamurthy  et  al.,  2005)  and  expectation 
maximisation algorithms (Bee, 2006). 
When  modelling  operational  risk,  other  methods  that  change  the  number  of  researched  data  of 
operational risk events are used. The first one are the robust statistic methods used Chernobai and 
Ratchev (2006) that exclude outliers from a data sample (e.g. 5% or 10% the highest operational risk 
events). On the other hand, a stress-testing method adds more data to a data sample and is widely used 
by financial institutions (Arai (2006), Rosengren (2006) or Rippel (2008)).   
More recently, Peters and Terauds (2006), van Leyveld et al. (2007), Chernobai et al. (2007) or Jobst 
(2007c) summarise an up-to-date development of operational risk management from both views of 
academics and practitioners.  
3.  An Overview of Operational Risk and Economic Capital 
3.1  Basics of Operational Risk 
There are many definitions of operational risk such as “the risk arising from human and technical 
errors and accidents” (Jorion, 2000) or “a measure of the link between a firm’s business activities and 
the  variation  in  its  business  results”  (King,  2001).  The  Basel  Committee  offers  a  more  accurate 
definition  of  operational  risk  as  “the  risk  of  loss  resulting  from  inadequate  or  failed  internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events failures” (BCBS, 2006, p.144). This definition 
encompasses a relatively broad area of risks, with the inclusion of for instance, strategic, transaction 
or legal risk (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Operational risk and main factors 
People Systems Processes External Events
Fraud, collusion and other 
criminal activities
IT problems (hardware or 
software failures, computer 





Criminal activities (theft, 
terrorism or vandalism)




Unauthorized access to 
information ans systems 
security
Errors in models, 
methologies and mark to 
market (model risk)
Poltical and military events 
(wars or international 
sanctions)





questionable integrity of 
data
Accounting and taxation 
errors Inadequate 
formalization of internal 
procedures
Change in the political, 
regulatory and tax 
environment (strategic risk)
Loss of important 
employees (illness, injury, 





Change in the legal 
environment (legal risk)
Natural events (fire, 
earthquake, flood etc.)
Violations of systems 
security
Utility outages Inadequate definition and 
attribution of 
responsibilities
Operational failure at 
suppliers or outsourced 
operations  
Source: Based on Sironi and Resti (2007)  
However, the reputation risk (damage to an organisation through loss of its reputational or standing) 
and strategic risk (the risk of a loss arising from a poor strategic business decision) are excluded from   6
the Basel II definition. The reason is that the term “loss” under this definition includes only those 
losses  that  have  a  discrete  and  measurable  financial  impact  on  the  firm.  Hence  strategic  and 
reputational  risks  are  excluded,  as  they  would  not  typically  result  in  a  discrete  financial  loss 
(Fontnouvelle et al., 2003). Other significant risks such as market risk
8 and credit risk
9 are treated 
separately in the Basel II. 
Some peculiarities of operational risk exist compared to market and credit risks. The main difference 
is the fact that operational risk is not taken on a voluntary basis but is a natural consequence of the 
activities performed by a financial institution (Sironi and Resti, 2007). In addition, from a view of risk 
management it is important that operational risk suffers from a lack of hedging instruments. For other 
peculiarities see Table 2. 
Table 2: Operational risk peculiarities 
Market and Credit Risks  Operational Risks 
Consciously and willingly face  Unavoidable 
“Speculative” risk, implying losses and profits  Pure risks, implying losses only* 
Consistent  with  an  increasing  relationship 
between risk and expected return 
Not  consistent  with  an  increasing  relationship 
between risk and expected return 
Easy to identify and understand  Difficult to identify and understand 
Comparatively easy to measure and identify  Difficult to measure and identify 
Large availability of hedging instruments  Lack of effective hedging instruments 
Comparatively easy to price and transfer  Difficult to price and transfer 
* with few exceptions 
Source: Based on Sironi and Resti (2007) 
3.2  Modelling operational risk 
There  are two main ways to assess operational risk – the top-down  approach  and the bottom-up 
approach. Under the top-down approach, operational losses are quantified on a macro level only, 
without  attempting  to  identify  the  events  or  causes  of  losses  (Chernobai  et  al.,  2007).  The  main 
advantage of these models is their relative simplicity and no requirement for collecting data. Top-
down  models  include  multifactor  equity  price  models,  capital  asset  pricing  model,  income-based 
                                                 
8 The risk of losses (in and on- and off-balance sheet positions) arising from movements in market prices, including interest rates, 
exchange rates, and equity values (Chernobai et al., 2007). 
9 The potential that a bank borrower or counterparty fails to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms (Chernobai et al., 
2007).   7
models, expense-based models, operating leverage models, scenario analysis and stress testing and 
risk indicator models. 
On the other hand, bottom-up models quantify operational risk on a micro level and are based on the 
identification of internal events. Their advantages lie in a profound understanding of operational risk 
events (the way how and why are these events formed). Bottom-up models encompass three main 
subcategories: process-based models (causal models and Bayesian belief networks, reliability models, 
multifactor causal factors), actuarial models (empirical loss distribution based models, parametric loss 
distribution based models, models based on extreme value theory) and proprietary models.
 10  
As recommended by many authors such as Chernobai et al. (2007) or van Leyveld (2007), the best 
way for operational risk management is a combination of both approaches. In the paper we follow this 
best  practice  and  employ  bottom-up  approaches  for  operational  risk  modelling  (LDA  and  EVT 
methods as described below) and compare the results. 
3.3  Top-down approach of modelling operational risk 
Basel II provides an operational risk framework for banks and financial institutions. The framework 
includes  identification,  measurement,  monitoring,  reporting,  control  and  mitigation  of  operational 
risk. Stated differently, it requires procedures for proper measurement of operational risk losses (i.e. 
ex-post activities such as reporting and monitoring) as well as for active management of operational 
risk  (i.e.  ex-ante  activities  such  as  planning  and  controlling).  The  Basel  Committee  distinguishes 
seven main categories of operational risk and eight business lines for operational risk measurement as 
depicted in the following table (Table 3). 
Table 3: Business lines and event types according to Basel II 
Business line Event type
1. Corporate Finance 1. Internal Fraud
2. Trading & Sales 2. External Fraud
3. Retail Banking 3. Employment Practices and Workplace Safety
4. Commercial Banking 4. Clients, Products and Business Practices
5. Payment & Settlement  5. Damage to Physical Assets
6. Agency Services 6. Business Disruption and System Failure
7. Asset Management 7. Execution, Delivery and Process Management
8. Retail Brokerage  
Source: BCBS (2006) 
 
Basel II is based on three main pillars. Pillar I of Basel II provides guidelines for measurement of 
operational risk, Pillar II requires adequate procedures for managing operational risk and Pillar III sets 
up requirements on information disclosure of the risk.    
Basel II distinguishes three main approaches to operational risk measurement: 
 
1)  Basic indicator approach (BIA) 
                                                 
10 For more detailed description of these models see Chernobai et al. (2007), pages 67–75.   8
2)  Standardised approach (SA) 
3)  Advanced measurement approach (AMA) 
 
Under the BIA, the simplest approach, gross income
11 serves as a proxy for the scale of operational 
risk of the bank. Hence the bank must hold capital for operational risk equal to the average over the 
previous three years of a fixed percentage (denoted as alpha, α) of positive annual gross income
12. 
Alpha was set at 15 %. 



















      (1) 
GIt  - gross income at time t 
n  - the number of the previous three years for which gross income was positive 
α  - the fixed percentage of gross income (15%) 
 
The SA
13 is very similar to the BIA, only the activities of banks are dividend into eight business lines. 
Within each business line, gross income is a broad indicator of operational risk exposure. Capital 
requirement ranges from 12 to 18 % (denoted as beta, β) of gross income in the respective business 
line (see Table 4).  























     (2) 
GItk  - gross income at time i for business line k 
βk  - a fixed percentage of GI for each of eight business lines 
 
                                                 
11 Gross income = interest income + non-interest income. 
12  When gross income is negative, the figure is excluded from both numerator and denominator. 
13 An alternative to the SA exists – the Alternative Standardised Approach, which uses for the Retail Banking and the Commercial 
Banking total loans and advances as a proxy for the scale of operational risk of the bank (instead of gross income).   9





Trading and sales 18%
Retail banking 12%
Commercial Banking 15%
Payment and settlement 18%
Agency services 15%
Asset management 12%
Retail brokerage 12%  
Source: BCBS (2006) 
3.4  Bottom-up approaches of modelling operational risk 
Under the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), the regulatory capital requirement shall equal 
the risk measure generated by the bank’s internal operational risk measurement system. The bank 
must  meet  certain  qualitative  (e.g.  quality  and  independence  of  operational  risk  management, 
documentation of loss events, regular audit) and quantitative (internal and external data collection, 
scenario analysis) standards to qualify for using the AMA. For instance, a bank must demonstrate that 
its operational risk measure is evaluated for one-year holding period and a high confidence level 
(99.9% under Basel II
14). The use of the AMA is subject to supervisory approval.  
The above-mentioned description of three approaches indicates that the BIA is the simplest while the 
AMA is the most advanced. The idea behind Basel II requirements lies in the assumption that 
 
AMA SA BIA K K K > >        (3) 
 
In other words, equation 3 implies that the AMA capital charge (KAMA) should be lower than KBIA 
and KSA. Therefore banks should be motivated to use the most advanced approach – AMA
15. At 
present most banks use a combination of two AMA approaches to measure operational risk: 
•  The  loss  distribution  approach  (LDA),  which  is  a  quantitative  statistical  method  analysing 
historical loss data. 
•  The scorecard approach, which focuses on qualitative risk management in a financial institution 
(this approach was developed and implemented at the Australian New Zealand Bank (Lawrence, 
2000). 
The above-mentioned approaches complement each other. As a historical data analysis is backward-
looking  and  quantitative,  the  scorecard  approach  encompasses  forward-looking  and  qualitative 
indicators.  In  our  analysis  we  concentrate  on  the  first  approach  because  of  the  data  availability. 
                                                 
14 BCBS (2006) p.151. 
15 The lower capital charge hold by a bank should result in its higher profitability.   10
However,  we  would  like  to  point  out  that  a  combination  of  both  approaches  is  necessary  for 
successful operational risk management.  
Once operational risks have been assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively, the next step is to 
manage them, the following ways are suggested (Fitch Ratings, 2007):  
•  avoidance of certain risks; 
•  acceptance of others, but an effort to mitigate their consequences;  
•  or simply acceptance some risks as a part of doing business. 
3.5  Economic capital 
A  concept  of  economic  capital  is  used  for  modelling  operational  risk  through  the  AMA. 
However, no unique definition of economic capital exists. For instance, Mejstřík, Pečená and 
Teplý (2007) state “economic capital is a buffer against future, unexpected losses brought 
about by credit, market, and operational risks inherent in the business of lending money”. 
Alternatively, van Leyveld (2007) offers the following definition: “economic capital can be 
defined as the amount  of capital that a transaction or business unit requires in order to 
support the economic risk it originates, as perceived by the institution itself”. Alternatively, 
Chorofas (2006) defines economical capital as “the amount necessary to be in business – at a 
99%  or  better  level  of  confidence  –  in  regard  to  assume  risks”.We  should  distinguish 
economic  capital  from  regulatory  capital  that  can  be  defined  as  capital  used  for  the 
computation of capital adequacy set by the Basel II requirements (Mejstřík, Pečená and Teplý, 
2008)  or  as  the  minimum  amount  needed  to  have  a  license  (Chorofas,  2006).    Figure  1 
presents the difference between economic and regulatory capital. 














Source: Authors based on Chorofas (2006) and BCBS (2006) 
As the figure shows, regulatory capital should cover (e.g. in the form of provisions) both expected 
losses and unexpected losses (but excluding extreme events) while economic capital should cover 
unexpected losses. In addition, economic capital should cover both risk capital with 99.9% scenarios 
and  capital  for  extreme  events.  The  latter  is  important  for  modelling  operational  risk  as  “low   11
frequency/high severity” losses often occur, what is supported by many researchers such as Chernobai 
(2006), Dutta and Perry (2006) or as it will be shown later, by our results. As the examples of extreme 
events, we can list 9/11 events in 2001, flooding in the Czech Republic in 2002 or Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005. 
4.  Data analysis 
4.1  Data used 
In this study we have used data from the Bank. Altogether the dataset consists of more than six 
hundred operational losses over the period 2001-2007. However, there are disproportionally fewer 
observations in the beginning of the sample (January 2001-November 2003) signalling lower quality 
of data when the process of collecting operational losses data was just starting. In order to remove 
possible bias, we have left out 14 observations of this period. 
Moreover, the threshold for collecting the data in the Bank (about $1,000) is set quite low compared 
to other studies, the threshold is typically of the order of $10,000, hence we further cut some of the 
observations from the beginning as we describe in the section dealing with LDA. By setting the 
threshold up to $10,000 we have left out many small losses, hence the number of observation in our 
dataset further decreased up to 236
16.  
Observations  across  years  starting  from  December  2004  are  by  simple  graphical  inspection  quite 
stationary and hence can be considered to be collected by consistent methodology. However, there is 
a significant variation across months; particularly losses in December are significantly more frequent. 
This can be explained by the end of fiscal year when all possible unrecorded losses up to a date finally 
appear on the books. This is not a problem when losses are treated on annual basis or independent of 
time, however, it hinders the possibility to take into account monthly information.  
Generally, our dataset is not very big, but it is satisfactory enough for operational risk analysis at the 
level of the whole bank. For analysis focusing on particular business lines and/or particular type of 
loss events we would need more observations. 
4.2  Exploratory data analysis 
To get a better understanding of the structure and characteristics of the data we have firstly performed 
Exploratory  Data  Analysis  as  suggested  by  Tukey  (1977).  Operational  risk  data  are  skewed  and 
heavy-tailed; hence skewness and kurtosis are the most important characteristics. We have utilised 
some of the measures proposed by Hoaglin (1985) and Tukey (1977) used in Dutta and Perry (2007) 
to analyse skewness and kurtosis. Regarding skewness, if the data are symmetric then 
 
5 . 0 1 5 . 0 X X X X p p − = − − , 
 
where Xp, X1-p, and X0.5 are the 100p
th percentile, 100(1-p)
th percentile, and the median of the data 
respectively. If the data are from a symmetric distribution such as the normal distribution, the plot X0.5 
                                                 
16 Although the number of observations left out is high, they account only for about 2.5% of the sum of total operational losses in the 
sample. A $ 10,000 threshold is commonly used in operational risk modelling (see Duta, Perry (2007) or Chernobai (2007)).    12
– Xp against X1-p – X0.5 would be a straight line with unit slope. As Figure 2
17 clearly reveals, our data 
are far from symmetric, near the median they are negatively skewed owning to the low threshold for 
operational losses in the Bank, then it turns to positive as a consequence of high losses in the right tail 
of the distribution. 























Another measure of skewness is provided by a mid-summary plot in which the mid-summary of the 
data is defined as 
 




For symmetric data, the mid-summary must be equal to the median for all percentiles p. For a dataset 
exhibiting systematic skewness, the mid-summary plot against 1 – p exhibits gradual diversion from 
the median, for unsystematic skewness, the plot changes sharply with varying quantiles driven by 
extreme observations. Figure 3 displays both, the systematic skewness for the lower quantiles and 
unsystematic skewness for the highest 10% of data, which is even stronger for the last 5%. Both 







                                                 
17 Please note that in this figure and later in our analysis we have followed the common practice and have replaced actual numbers on 
the axes by normalised numbers as to preserve the confidentiality of the data.   13

































where Zp is the quantile of the standard normal distribution. For the normal distribution the pseudo 
sigma is constant and equal to a standard deviation σ. On the other hand, increasing or decreasing 
pseudo  sigma  with  p  is  a  signal  of  leptokurtotic  (heavy-tailed)  or  platokurtotic  (light-tailed) 
distribution, respectively. As Hoaglin (1985) suggested, we have plot natural logarithm of pseudo 
sigma against Z
2 (Figure 4). Steadily increasing plot confirms the hypothesis that our data are heavy-
tailed. 
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5.  Methodology 
5.1  Concept of VAR, modelling frequency and aggregation of losses 
Before describing individual approaches to model operational risk, we would like to define Value at 
Risk (VAR), a risk informative indicator recognised by Basel II requirements.
18 Jorion (2007) defines 
VAR as “the maximum loss over a target horizon such that there is a low, prespecified probability 
that the actual loss will be higher”. Usually VAR is expressed as a corresponding value (in currency 
units)  of  p%  quantile  of  a  distribution
19  where  p  is  the  prespecified  low  probability  and  f(x)  is 




VAR dx x f p ) (  
Alternatively, VAR is a cut-off point of the distribution beyond which the probability of the loss 
occurrence  is  less  than  p.  For  operational  risk  losses  the  quantile  defined  in  Basel  II  is  99.9% 
(see Figure 1), thus we will report VAR99.9 for each modelling method used. The target horizon is one 
year, so a 99.9% VAR requirement can be interpreted as the maximum loss incurred over 1,000 years. 
There is one complication associated with the above definition of VAR and the requirement of Basel 
II. The above density function f(x) has to combine both the severity and frequency of losses for a 
period of one year which is analytically difficult in specific cases (Embrechts et al., 2005). One of the 
approaches suggested (e.g. Cruz, (2002), Embrechts et al. (2005) or Dutta and Perry (2007)) is the 
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation where for a simulation of a given year a number of losses is drawn 
from a frequency distribution and each loss in the year is simulated by a random quantile of a severity 
distribution. All losses in each of the simulated years are then summed to arrive at the estimation of 
the combined distribution function. The 99.9% quantile is then taken from these simulated annual 
losses as the estimator of the 99.9% VAR. We have simulated 10,000 years, however, as argued by 
Embrechts et al. (2005) for rare events, the convergence of the MC estimator to the true values may 
not be particularly fast, so in real applications either using more iterations or refining the standard MC 
by importance sampling technique is suggested
20. 










having a single parameter λ. We have estimated it using three complete years 2004-2006 and for each 
year of the simulation we generated a random number of losses based on this parameter. 
For EVT we have not  modelled the whole distribution but rather the tail by  applying either the 
generalised  extreme  value  (GEV)  or  the  generalised  Pareto  distribution  (GPD).  In  these  cases 
                                                 
18 For more details on the VAR methodology see the traditional risk management books such as Jorion (2007), Saunders and Cornett 
(2006) or Sironi and Resti (2007). 
19 Although it is sometimes also defined as the difference between the mean and the quantile. 
20 Furthermore, the outlined aggregation of losses assumes that individual losses and the density function for severity and frequency are 
independent; in the context of operational losses this is a reasonable assumption.   15
(following Dutta et al., 2007) we have used empirical sampling
21 for the body of the distribution. 
Hence, the VAR has been calculated by a MC simulation in which a part of losses was drawn from 
the actual past losses and the other part was modelled by an EVT model. The proportion of losses in 
the tail for the calculation of VAR was set to 2% as this percentage of the highest losses appears to be 
the best to fit the data. The frequencies were again modelled using the Poisson distribution. 
5.2  Loss distribution approach 
In the loss distribution approach (LDA) we have made use of a few parametric distributions to try to 
model the whole distribution of the operational losses. As  we have seen in the exploratory data 
analysis,  the  empirical  distribution  of  our  data  is  highly  skewed  and  leptokurtotic,  hence  the 
distribution we have chosen allows for this. As the benchmark, exponential distribution with only one 
parameter is utilised, secondly, three two-parameter distributions (standard gamma, lognormal, and 
log-logistic) and the five-parameter generalised hyperbolic (GH) distribution. GH distribution belongs 
into general class of distributions and entails a wide range of other distributions and hence is more 
flexible for modelling. 
Adequacy of each of the distributions is verified graphically by QQ-plots (Embrechts et al., 1997) and 
by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics D
+, D
- and D and the Kuiper statistic V. The statistics are 
defined as following 
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To calculate critical values for the statistics for different distributions we have followed procedure in 
D’Agostino and Stephens (1986). Based on the sample parameters we have drawn 10,000 simulations 
of the size n where n is the number of our observations. For each simulation we have reestimated the 
parameters, calculated the test statistics based on these parameters and used 10%, 5%, and 1% of the 
highest values of the statistics as the critical values. 
As we have already mentioned, the threshold for the operational losses in the Bank is set quite low, so 
in  order  to  improve  the  fit  as  low  losses  might  be  differently  distributed  we  have  increased  the 
threshold to $3,000, $6,000, and $10,000. Since, the last figure provided the best results and is in line 
with other studies we report only outcomes using this threshold. 
To estimate the parameters for the four simple distributions maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
has been employed, whereas for the estimation of the GH distribution we have utilised quantile-based 
method given in Hoaglin (1985). As argued in Duta and Perry (2007), quantile-based methods can 
potentially be more accurate for fitting the tails of distribution compared to MLE. 
The random variable X has an exponential distribution, if its density is 
 
0 , 0 ), exp( ) ( > > − = λ λ λ x x x f , 
 
                                                 
21 Empirical sampling – randomly drawing actual losses from the dataset.   16
where λ is the only parameter referred to as rate or as scale if expressed as 1/ λ. 
The random variable X has a standard 2-parameter gamma distribution, if its density is 
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x x x x f , 
 
where α is the shape parameter, β is the scale parameter and Г(α) is the gamma function defined as 
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0
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The random variable X has a 2-parameter lognormal distribution, if ln(X) is distributed as normal 
distribution N(µ, σ
2) defined as 
 





























x f , 
 
where µ is the location and σ the scale parameter. 
The random variable X has a log-logistic distribution (also known as the Fisk distribution), if its 
density is 
































where a is the shape and b is the scale parameter. 
The GH family of distributions introduced by Tukey (1977) is a transformation of the standard normal 
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where A, B, g, and h are the location, the scale, the shape parameter responsible for skewness, and the 
shape parameter responsible for kurtosis
22, respectively. Martinez and Iglewiczh (1984) have shown 
that GH distribution can approximate a wide variety of distributions by choosing appropriate values of 
A, B, g, and h. The following summarises estimation of parameters of the distributions based on Dutta 
and Perry (2007), the details can be found in Hoaglin (1985). 
Defining  Xp  and  Zp  as  the  100p


































where X0.5, the median of the data, is equal to A. Because there are many different gp depending on the 
percentile p, Hoaglin (1985) suggests choosing g equal to the median of gp. It can be shown that 
 





















Given  that  operational  risk  data  are  positively  skewed  and  heavy-tailed  to  the  right,  it  is  more 
appropriate to express the left-hand side of this expression using the upper half spread (UHS) as 
defined in Hoaglin (1985): 
( )
1










So once A and g are determined, the values of B and h can be found from OLS regression of ln(UHS) 
on  Z
2
p/2.  The  exponential  value  of  the  intercept  is  the  estimate  of  B,  and  the  coefficient  of  the 
regression is an estimate of h. 
6.  Extreme value theory 
Extreme value theory (EVT) is a promising class of approaches to modelling of operational risk. 
Although originally utilised in other fields such as hydrology or non-life insurance, EVT is capable of 
modelling low frequency, high severity instances of operational losses. There are two main kinds of 
models  in  EVT.  More  traditional  models  are  block  maxima  models  which  are  for  the  largest 
observations collected from large samples of identically distributed observations. The whole sample is 
divided into equal non-overlapping time intervals and the biggest loss from each interval is used for 
modelling  (Figure  5,  left  pane).  In  the  peak  over  threshold  (POT)  model  (or  the  threshold 
exceedances model), a  more-modern  approach, the large  enough threshold is determined and  the 
observations above are considered. For both block maxima and POT there is a theorem regarding 
limiting distribution.  
                                                 
22 The parameters g, and h can possibly be polynomial functions of Z
2, we considered only constant g and h in the estimation.   18
 
 
Figure 5 – Block maxima model vs. Peak over threshold model 
   
 
6.1  Block maxima models 
Using the Fisher-Tippet and Gnenenko theorem the limiting distribution for normalised maxima is the 
GEV distribution (for more details see e.g. Embrechts et al., 2005). The distribution function of the 

























































where (following Chernobai et al., 2007) 
 















x refers to the maxima, µ∈R, and σ > 0, µ is the location parameter, σ is the scale parameter, and ξ is 
the shape parameter.  
The GEV distribution can be divided into three cases based on the value of the shape parameter. For 
ξ > 0, the GEV is of the Fréchet case which is particularly suitable for operational losses as the tail of 
the distribution is slowly varying (power decay), hence it is able to account for high operational 
losses. It may be further shown that E(X
k)=∞ for k > 1/ξ, thus for instance if ξ ≥ 1/2 a distribution has 
infinite variance and higher moments (Embrechts et al., 1997).    19
The Gumbel case (ξ = 0) is also plausible for operational losses, although a tail is decreasing faster 
(exponential decay), it has a heavier tail than the normal distribution. The moments are always finite 
(E(X
k) < ∞ for k > 0). The Weibull case (ξ < 0) is of the least importance as the right endpoint is 
finite, hence unable to model heavy tails of operational losses. The GEV distribution can be fitted 
using various methods, we are going to describe and use the two most commonly used, maximum 
likelihood and probability-weighted moments. Denoting fξ,µ,σ the density of the GEV distribution, and 
M1,…,Mm being  the block maxima, the log-likelihood is calculated to be 
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which  must  be  maximised  subject  to  the  parameter  constraints  that  σ  >  0  and 
1 + ξ(Mi – µ)/σ > 0 for all i. (for more details see Embrechts et al., 2005). 
Probability weighted moments (PWM), the second used approach to estimate parameters of GEV, has 
better applicability to small samples than maximum likelihood (ML) method (Landwehr et al., 1979). 
Following  Hosking  et  al.  (1985),  although  probability  weighted  estimators  are  asymptotically 
inefficient compared to ML estimators, no deficiency is detectable in samples of 100 or less. As the 
number of extreme observations is typically limited, this property of PWM makes it very valuable in 
operational risk modelling. The probability-weighted moments of the GEV distribution for ξ ≠ 0 are 
given by
23 









































From this we have 
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From this, the PWM estimators  µ ˆ ,  σ ˆ ,  ξ ˆ  are obtained when  r β  are replaced by their estimators. 
Given a random sample of size n from the distribution F, estimation of  r β ˆ  can be based on the 
ordered sample x1 ≤ x2 ≤  … ≤ xn. The statistic 
                                                 
23 In the following four expressions, we changed the sign of ξ as in the original paper the distribution function was defined with the 
inverse sign of ξ compared to the definition we use.   20
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is an unbiased estimator of  r β ˆ
 (Landwehr et al., 1979). 
Adequacy of the GEV model is verified similarly to LDA by QQ-plots (Embrechts et al., 1997) and 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics D
+, D
- and D and the Kuiper statistic V based on Chandra et al. 
(1981). The statistics are defined as in the Section 5.2. 
 
6.2  Points over threshold models 
As argued by Embrechts et al. (2005) block maxima models are very wasteful of data as they consider 
only the highest losses in large blocks. Consequently, methods based on threshold exceedances are 
used more frequently in practice. These methods utilize all data that exceed a particular designated 
high level. Based on the Pickands-Balkema-de Haan theorem, the limiting distribution of such points 
over thresholds (POT) is the GPD. The distribution function of the generalised (two-parameter) GDP 


































where σ > 0, and x ≥ 0, when ξ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ -σ/ξ when ξ < 0; 
x refers to the extreme observations above the threshold, β is the scale parameter, and ξ is the shape 
parameter. 
Similarly to the GEV distribution, the generalised GDP contains a number of special cases: when ξ > 
0 the distribution is of an ordinary Pareto distribution; when ξ = 0 there is an exponential distribution, 
ξ < 0 leads to a short-tailed, Pareto type II distribution. The condition for existence of moments in the 
heavy-tailed case (ξ > 0) is E(X
k)=∞ for k ≥ 1/ξ. 
The critical issue in this approach is to determine the threshold u. A simple approach using an excess 
plot is typically employed. For positive-valued loss data X1, …, Xn the sample mean excess function is 
defined as an empirical estimator of the mean excess function 
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where ν is the value above threshold (ν ≥ u). Threshold values against mean excess values provide the 
mean excess plot. If the data support a GPD model, this plot should become increasingly “linear” for 
higher values of ν. 
Maximum likelihood (ML) and probability weighted moments (PWM) are again the primary methods 
used for parameters estimation. The log-likelihood for excess losses Yi (Xi – u, where u is the given 
threshold) given the density function fξ,σ can be calculated to be (e.g. Embrechts et al., 2005) 
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which must be maximised subject to σ > 0 and 1 + ξYi / σ > 0 for all i. 

























The PWM estimators α and ξ are obtained by replacing α0 and a1 by estimators based on an observed 
sample of size.  The unbiased and consistent possibility is 
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where x1 ≤ x2 ≤  … ≤ xn is the ordered sample. 
 
Again, the adequacy of the model is verified by QQ-plots and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics D
+, 
D
- and D and the Kuiper statistic. As critical values for the GPD have not been found, we have 
estimated them using the simulation approach described in the section devoted to LDA. 
7.  Empirical results 
7.1  Loss distribution approach 
As would be expected, the simple parametric distributions with one or 2-parameters are far too simple 
to model operational loss data. Although moving from exponential to a gamma distribution and from 
a gamma to a lognormal or a log-logistic somewhat improves the fit, both QQ plots and the test 
                                                 
24 In the following two expressions, the sign of ξ is again changed as the distribution function was defined with the inverse sign.   22
statistics (Table 5) reject the hypothesis that the data follow any of these distributions. The reason is 
that the losses in the end of the tail of the distribution are significantly underpredicted as can be seen 
in Figure 6. 








Note: √nD stands for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and (√nV) the Kuiper statistic 
 
Figure 6 – QQ plots for the exponential (panel a), gamma (b), lognormal (c) and the log-logistic distribution (d) 
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The results for the GH distribution are not much better (Table 6, Figure 7). Although this distribution 
is flexible enough to model extremely high losses, the highest loss in the dataset that is almost twice   23
the second largest loss causes the estimated GH distribution parameter for kurtosis to be very high and 
hence the distribution overpredicts the high losses, while underpredicting the lower losses. We can 
conclude that the whole distribution pattern of operational losses with rather limited observations is 
not possible to be captured even with a general class of distributions such as the GH distribution. 



































Although none of the parametric distributions got close to a reasonable fit, we have still calculated 
VAR for these models (Table 7) to have at least an idea of the calculated VAR. From the table we can 
draw similar conclusion as from the Q-Q plots. The first three distributions provide relatively low 
capital requirements in the range (2.0-2.7%). Based on the Fisk distribution the calculated capital 
requirement is much higher as this distribution allow for higher losses. Finally, the GH distribution 
provides  unreasonably  high  capital  requirement  owning  to  the  high  shape  parameter  and 
overprediction of the highest losses. 
 








VAR (99.9%) - Monte-Carlo
   24
7.2  Block maxima models 
Two different scenarios have been employed when applying the block maxima model, the highest 
losses in each month and the highest dozen (twelve) of losses
25. For each scenario the parameters 
were estimated by MLE and PWM.  
Table 8 shows the resulting estimate of the shape parameter
26. 
 
Table 8 – Block maxima models – the shape parameter 
MLE PWM
Max. each month 1.22 0.78
Max. dozen 1.95 0.45  
 
Although both estimation methods indicate a heavy tail of the distribution, MLE and PWM yield quite 
different results for both block maxima models. While for PWM the parameters are less than one, 
(even less than 0.5 for the second model indicating finite variance) the parameters derived from MLE 
are well above one (infinite mean), indicating extremely heavy tailed data. 
Table 9 depicts the goodness-of-fit statistics, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (√nD) and the Kuiper statistic 
(√nV), if the p-value is below 1%, the hypothesis of a good fit of the model is rejected on the 1% 
significance level. On the contrary, if it is above 10%, the model appears as very appropriate to model 
the data. The other cases are in-between these two boundary cases. 
 
Table 9 – Block maxima models - the goodness-of-fit statistics (p-values) 
√nD √nV √nD √nV
Max. each month <0.01 <0.01 >0.01 <0.01




From the above table we can conclude that the second model (the maximum dozen model) fitted by 
PWM produces the best results, while the use of MLE for the first model can be rejected. The other 
two cases deliver mixed results. 
 
 
                                                 
25 As the twelve losses are not the maximas as defined in the theorem for the limiting distribution, there is no assurance that this 
scenario will even in the limit follow the GEV distribution. However, the GEV can still be a good model that fits the data well. 
26 We again follow the current practice not to show the location and the scale parameter for the confidentiality reasons and we just show 
the shape parameter which is of the highest importantance from the modelling perspective.   25

























Block maxima - max. dozen (PWM)
 
 
The QQ-plot above shows that although the maximum dozen model estimated by PWM slightly 
underpredicts the highest losses, the fit of the data is very good, supporting the adequacy of this 
model. 
7.3  Points over threshold models 
We have chosen four different models. Firstly, using the excess plot we have identified a threshold 
(Figure 9). The plot is reasonably linear over the given range; the threshold is set at the level of a 
small “kink” where the slope decreases slightly
27. This threshold is slightly higher than 10% of all 
losses in the data set. Additionally, we have used 2%, 5% and 10% of the highest losses.  
 

























                                                 
27 Slightly above 0.04 on the virtual horizontal axis.   26
Again, the shape parameter obtained from different methods differs significantly ( 
Table 10). However, we can trace some consistency at least from the PWM results. As noted by 
Embrechts (2005) the shape parameter of the limiting GPD for the excesses is the same as the shape 
parameter of the limiting GEV distribution for the maxima. Indeed, for our data, the block maxima 
model of maximum dozen losses (approximately 2% of losses) is close to the threshold of 2% highest 
losses from the POT model. Additionally, the other three POT models have the shape estimates close 
to each other.  
Table 10 – Threshold exceedances models - the shape parameter  
MLE PWM
Losses > a threshold 1.02 0.77
Max. 10% losses 1.08 0.77
Max. 5% losses 1.55 0.73
Max. 2 % losses 0.93 0.48 
Regarding the goodness-of-fit, the outcomes (Table 11) are generally plausible for both estimation 
methods. Therefore, we can conclude, that the models appear reasonable from the statistical point of 
view.  QQ-plot  is  produced  (Figure  10)  for  the  maximum  2%  model  estimated  by  PWM,  which 
exhibits the best visual fit and at the same time displays consistency with the block maxima model. 
Table 11 – Threshold exceedances models - the goodness-of-fit statistics (p-values) 
√nD √nV √nD √nV
Losses > a threshold >0.10 >0.05 >0.01 >0.05
Max. 10% losses >0.10 >0.10 >0.01 >0.10
Max. 5% losses >0.10 >0.10 <0.01 >0.025
Max. 2 % losses >0.10 >0.10 >0.10 >0.10
MLE PWM
 

























Threshold Exceedances - Max. 2% losses (PWM)
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The Table 12 summarises the result for EVT. The high shape parameters for some of the models 
estimated  by  MLE  result  in  unreasonable  high  capital  estimates,  higher  than  100%  of  the 
corresponding bank income
28. On the other hand, capital estimates by PWM are quite consistent from 
a practical point of view, ranging from 6.9%–10.0%, indicating alongside with the arguments already 
mentioned that this method might be more suitable in the estimation of operational risk when the data 
are limited.  
As  discussed  above,  Central  European  banks  usually  do  not  possess  a  methodology  to  model 
operational risk since they rely on the competence of their parent companies to calculate operational 
risk requirement on the consolidated basis of the whole group.  The issue worth investigating is if 
there  is  any  benefit  from  shifting  the  calculation  of  operational  risk  capital  requirement  to  the 
subsidiary level, especially taking into account the translation and transaction risks necessary for 
consolidated  reporting.    Although  the  PWM  methodology  might  give  reasonable  results  for  a 
subsidiary, parent companies need to consolidate capital requirements of their subsidiaries (not only 
operational risk but also for credit, market and other risks). Therefore the parent companies use their 
models and the subsidiaries usually provide these models only with some modifications (e.g. more 
data or scenario analysis). As documented both in the theory (OWC, 2001) and practice (Deutsche 
Bank (2007) or BBVA (2007)), this portfolio approach brings a diversification effect resulting in a 
lower capital requirement. For instance, Deutsche Bank recorded a 20% positive diversification effect 
of  an  overall  economic  capital  requirement  in  the  year  2007.  Similarly,  Banco  Bilbao  Vizcaya 
Argentaria estimated a 45–58% positive diversification effect for operational risk capital requirement 
in 2007.  
 
Table 12 – Summary of results - Extreme value theory  
MLE PWM MLE PWM
1 GEV - monthly maxima 1.22 0.78 83.4% 8.1%
2 GEV - max. dozen 1.95 0.45 >100% 7.2%
3 GPD - losses > a threshold 1.02 0.77 33.7% 7.7%
4 GPD - max. 10% losses 1.08 0.77 39.9% 6.9%
5 GPD - max. 5% losses 1.55 0.73 >100% 10.0%
6 GPD - max. 2% losses 0.93 0.48 >100% 9.2%
Model Description
Shape (ξ) VAR (99.9%) - Monte-Carlo
 
 
Table 13 presents a summary of our research. As we indicated earlier, EVT shows the best statistical 




                                                 
28 For a comparison, Basel II requires banks to hold a capital requirement for operational risk at 15% of banking income in case of using 
the Basic Indicator Approach (see the Section 3.3).   28
Table 13 – Summary of results – LDA & selected EVT models  
Body Tail Statistical fit Capital estimate (99.9%)
Exponential Exponential very poor 2.7%
Gamma Gamma very poor 2.1%
Lognormal Lognormal poor 2.0%
Log-logistic Log-logistic poor 9.5%
GH distribution GH distribution poor >100%
Empirical sampling EVT (block maxima, max. dozen, PWM) excellent 7.2%
Empirical sampling EVT (block maxima, max. 2%, PWM) excellent 9.2%  
8.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to analyse and model real operational data of a Central European 
Bank. We have utilized two approaches currently described in the literature. The LDA, in which 
parametric distributions are fitted to the whole data sample, was not able to capture the pattern of the 
data and was rejected based on the goodness-of-fit statistics.  Hence we conclude that the parametric 
distributions like exponential, gamma, log-normal, log-logistic and GH do not fit well the data. This 
result  proves  an  unusual  (heavy-tailed)  pattern  of  operational  risk  data  as  documented  by  many 
researchers such as Muller (2002), Cruz (2002), Moscadelli (2004), de Fontnouvelle et al. (2005) or 
Duta, Perry (2007). 
The EVT, on the other hand, for both block maxima and POT proved to fit the data in the tail of the 
distribution. We have used two estimation methods in the EVT approach, the standard MLE in which 
all the observation have the same weight and the PWM in which the observations higher in the tail 
have a higher weight.  
When applying the block maxima model we have found out that the maximum dozen model fitted by 
PWM produces the best results. Cruz (2002) used PWM to analyse fraud loss data on an undisclosed 
source for the 1992–1996 period and deduced that the data in 1994 and 1996 recorded a heavy-tailed 
GEV distribution. In addition, the Kuiper statistics for PWM showed the best results in all four years, 
which confirms our findings. 
POT models are frequently used for application of EVT to operational loss data. We observed that the 
high shape parameters for some of the MLE models bring unreasonable high capital estimates, what is 
consistent with Moscadelli (2004), de Fontnouvelle et al. (2005) or Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005). 
These authors also mention the estimates are highly sensitive to the chosen threshold, what again 
underpins our conclusions. Unlike the others, our research showed that PWM are quite consistent 
from a practical point of view and they might be suitable in the estimation of operational risk when 
data is limited. This result might be useful for the banks that have limited data series of operational 
risk events, what is typical for many Central European banks. 
From a policy perspective, it should be noted that emerging market banks, such as Central European 
banks,  face  increasing  exposure  to  operational  risk  events.  Data  from  the  Bank  evidenced  an 
improvement  over  time,  attributed  to  managements’  devoting  more  attention  to  recording  and 
mitigating operational risk events.  Moreover, as demonstrated in this analysis, successful estimates of 
the  distribution  of  these  risk  events  can  be  estimated  based  on  data  derived  from  more  mature 
markets.  
Despite  the  conclusions  cited  above,  there  are  still  several  ways  in  which  our  research  can  be 
improved. Firstly, a similar study can be done on a larger sample of data (we used the data from one   29
Central European bank). Secondly, the research provided on all eight business lines recognised by 
Basel II may reveal interesting facts about different operational risk features among various business 
lines. Finally, other research might include other results derives from modelling operational risk using 
such techniques as robust statistics, stress-testing, Bayesian inference, dynamic Bayesian networks 
and expectation maximisation algorithms. 
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